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It is generally recognized that the states have plenary power in educational
matters." Subject only to the limitations of the Federal Constitution as interpreted
and applied by the Supreme Court,2 states can operate their school systems under
whatever constitutional provisions and legislation they see fit to adopt.
Since the curriculum is so basic in educational endeavor, it is not surprising that
states have passed legislation pertaining thereto. Such legislation constitutes a form
of administrative supervision of pupils. Its analysis, therefore, falls properly within
the over-all title of this symposium.
In broad terms this article has as its intent the discussion of the general scope of
the supervision of pupils through state curriculum control. Included will be the
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness and wisdom of such control. Certain state
legislation which exerts an indirect control over the curriculum will be reviewed.
Since the quality and type of textbooks used in a school system frequently determine
the difference between an effective and an inadequate curriculum, a study and
evaluation of state laws bearing upon textbook selection is presented.
The efforts of the states at curriculum control will be balanced against parental
rights to determine the kind of education they desire their children to receive.
Since no phase of educational endeavor touches more closely the lives of pupils
and school patrons than matters pertaining to the curriculum, the present effort has
justification.
GENERAL SCOPE OF CURRICULUM CONTROL
A look at the general scope of state control over the curriculum offers the most
logical method of getting into the body of this article.
The school law statutes of the 48 states reveal that almost every jurisdiction
prescribes some subject matter. The paragraphs immediately following will outline
the range of provisions. A citation will furnish an illustration of each type of regu-
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lation. No attempt will be made in this article statistically to report frequency of
adoption of any particular type of curriculum control
Among the more common provisions4 are those requiring instruction in the
United States Constitution,' in American history,' in the State Constitution,7 in
civics,' in citizenship,' in health habits,'0 in temperance," in the evils of nar-
cotics,' 2 and in safety education. 3
A great variety of other requirements are mentioned. Illustrative are the follow-
ing provisions: that of Wisconsin demanding "study of the comparative vitamin
content and food and health values of dairy products and their importance for
human diet,"' 4 that of the same state calling upon every public school teacher "to
teach her pupils morality and how to conduct themselves as social beings,"'" that of
Iowa requiring "instruction in social problems and economics,"'" and that of New
York demanding the teaching of fire prevention and humane treatment of animals
and birds.'7
California forbids any teaching that reflects on specific nationality, color or
creed.' Utah does not permit teaching that is partisan, political, atheistic, infidel,
sectarian-religious or denominational?9  Tennessee makes it unlawful to teach
that man is descended from a lower animal and that the story of creation as taught
in the Bible is untrue20 In Michigan"' the teaching of birth control is outlawed.
The Oregon statute making it unlawful to teach any subject other than foreign
languages in any language other than English is typical of a provision found in
many states.22
Frequently legislative desires are couched in very general terms. For example,
New York23 and Illinois24 speak of setting up courses in patriotism, Indiana pre-
'A 1952 doctoral dissertation by BERNARD F. LouGHERY, Pas.rrAL RIGHTS iN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL
LAw (Catholic University of America Press, 1952), offers a good statistical analysis. An earlier statistical
approach by Brudney, Legislative Regulation of the Sodal Studies in Secondary Schools, 9 YEaRBOOK OF
SCHOOL LAW 140 (1941), is still to a large degree up to date.
'In at least half of the states. r MICH. Comp'. LAws §352.T5 (1948).
'IOWA CODE §280.8 (1954). 'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §4104 (1953).
'IND. STAT. ANN. §28-34o6 (1948 Replacement).
9 IOWA CODE §280.06.
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STAT. §163.170 (1949)) requires the teaching of "physiology and hygiene, including their several
branches, with special instruction as to tuberculosis, its nature, causes and prevention." Michigan (Comn.
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"
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"
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case of Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927).
"MIcH. CoMts. IAws §370.2 (1948).
~ORE. Comps. LAws ANN. §111-2032.23N. Y. EDUC. LAW §80.
"'ILL. REV. STAT. c. 122, §27-3 (1953).
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scribes instruction in common honesty, morality, courtesy and obedience to the law,
and respect for parents and home and the dignity of labor.2"
A good proportion of the states set forth subject matter lists which must be taught.
Most commonly the statute is aimed only at the elementary school. In some juris-
dictions the statute is pointed at the high school.
The California statute2" is quite typical of legislation which is directed at the
elementary school. The law states that
the course of study shall include instruction in the following prescribed branches .. .
Reading, writing, spelling, language study, arithmetic, geography, history of the United
States and of California, civics including a study of the Declaration of Independence and
of the Constitution of the United States, music, art, training for healthful living, morals
and manners, and such other studies not to exceed three as may be prescribed by the
board of education of the city, county, or city and county....
Kansas2 7 furnishes another example of the type of statute which sets forth in list
form elementary school subject matter which must be taught.
The school law of Indiana2" furnishes an illustration of a subject matter list for
the guidance of high schools. Enumerated is
mathematics, commercial arithmetic, algebra, geometry, history (United States, ancient,
medieval or modern), geography (commercial or physicial), English (composition,
rhetoric), literature (English, American), foreign language, science (biology, physics,
or chemistry), civil government (general and state), drawing and music.
The statute also provides that any local board may elect additional subjects.
The jurisdictions differ considerably in terms of the guidance which the school
law gives in respect to such details as grade placement and time allotment. Other
than the broad direction of placement within the elementary or high school fields
many of the laws give no guidance. Some laws are in certain respects quite specific.
Illinois2" provides an example of the specific in its statutory statement that in the
seventh and eighth grades not less than one hour per week is to be devoted to the
study of patriotism and the principles of representative government as found in the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. One hour a week is to be used
in high school for advanced study in the same area.
California furnishes another illustration. Its school law"° states that a maximum
of 50 per cent of each school week is to be devoted to reading, writing, language
study, spelling, arithmetic, and civics in grades one to six and a minimum of 6oo
minutes in each school week in grades seven and eight.
In varying degrees many state laws explicitly delegate responsibility for formu-
lating details as to courses of study and individual subject offerings. Even if the
school laws enumerate certain required subject matter, there is still much by way of
" IND. STAT. ANN. §28-3428 (1948 Replacement).
2" CAL. CODE EDuc. §10302 (1952). 2" KAN. GEN. STAT. §72-I0, (949).
2 IND. STAT. ANN. §28-3418 (948 Replacement).
2 ILL. IRv. STAT. §24-4 (1953). bCAL. CODE EDUC. §10303 (1952).
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power to implement the general suggestions that is delegated to school administrators
or administrative bodies.
Delaware furnishes a good example of state delegation of its power over the
school curriculum. The law of Delaware requires that the State Board of Education
prescribe rules and regulations determining the minimum course of study for all
public elementary and high schools.31 In each district, however, Boards of Educa-
tion are to adopt courses of study for the schools which are in accordance with the
rules and regulations set by the Delaware State Board of Education.3' Although pro-
viding that instruction in the Constitution of the United States and of the State of
Delaware must begin not later than the eighth grade and continue in high school,
the law permits the Board of Education to determine the exact extent of such in-
struction 3
Other illustrations, taken at random from statutes, will further reveal the extent
and nature of state delegation of power.
In Iowa teaching of the Constitution of the United States must start in the
eighth grade and continue in high school to an extent to be determined by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction. 4
The Regents of the University of the State of New York are to prescribe courses
in areas named in the statute. 5 Ohio requires boards of education of the county,
exempted village and city school districts to set up graded courses of study.36
The State Superintendent in Kansas37 presents for approval courses of study and
curriculums to the State Board of Education. However, the school laws of the
state make a number of mandatory suggestions concerning what must be taught.
Maine law orders the Commissioner of Education to enumerate the studies to be
taught in the public schools but reserves to local school authorities a right to add
additional courses. 38 Statutory guidance is given the Commissioner by the naming
of certain subjects which must be taught.
In California the law demands that a course of study for each high school shall
be prepared under the direction of the governing board having control thereof and
shall be subject to the approval of the State Board of Education.39
It is quite usual practice for states to entrust to metropolitan cities a large re-
sponsibility for the formulation of course programs. The Illinois school code fur-
nishes an instance. Within the section which pertains to cities having a "popula-
tion exceeding 500,000 inhabitants" the code states that "the general superintendent
of schools shall prescribe and control, subject to the approval of the board [City
Board of Education], the course of study and textbooks .... ,,40
State laws have not endeavored to force conformity to any particular method of
instruction or philosophy of education. In a few instances jurisdictions have at-
"DEL. CODE ANN. §122 (1953) 21d., §941 (1953).
:'Id. at §4104. "'IwA CODE §280.7 (1954).
'N. Y. EDuc. LAw §8oi (i953). 88 OHIo CODE ANN. §4837 (I945)
""KN. GEN. STAT. §109 (949). sME. REv. STAT. C. 37, §3 (1944).
9 CAL. CODE EDUC. §10501 (1952). 'ILL. REv. STAT. §34-8 (1953).
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tempted to require a standard of achievement. In Illinois41 no one is to be grad-
uated from the eighth grade who does not have a "comprehensive knowledge of the
history of the United States." Kansas42 has a similar regulation which says that no
person "shall be graduated who has not satisfactorily passed" courses in history, cit-
izenship, government and the Constitution of the United States.
EFFECTIVENESS AND WISDOM OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER THE CURRICULUM
Sufficient has now been written to demonstrate the more general pattern of state
legislative control of the curriculum. It should be quite apparent that state power
in the field is indeed only limited by local or federal constitutions.
Logical progression suggests at this time some thinking on the question of the
effectiveness and wisdom of the legislative endeavors. This thinking cannot take
place without giving recognition to the best modern philosophy toward curriculum
planning. For if state laws were seriously out of harmony with the skilled pro-
fessional educator's attitude toward curriculum planning, it would be in order to
question the wisdom of such laws.
The professional educator never stops planning the curriculum. He understands
that there are always pressures which logically dictate development and change.
The three R's will always need to be taught. But so will much in addition.
Hollis L. Caswell in his book, Curriculum Improvement," gives a good over-all
view of the current demands for curriculum change. He lists the major demands of
the time as for: greater international understanding, improved intergroup relations,
increased emphasis on education for family life, greater understanding of American
ideals and love of country, conservation education, and understanding of atomic
energy.
In support of his position he calls attention to a number of matters. Quoting
from a publication of the Educational Policies Commission of the National Educa-
tion Association and the American Association of School Administrators,44 Caswell
comments that every American is personally affected by the solutions found for the
problems that trouble the world and hence should be interested in their solution.
He mentions the attacks on America by those who point to our frequent lack of
harmonious relations between groups such as whites and Negroes, labor and man-
agement, and Catholics and Protestants. He reminds of the fact that the difficulties
found in the home are reflected in poor family relations and in a very high incidence
of broken homes. He points to the struggle between democracy and communism as
suggesting a vital need for a real understanding of the ideals of our country. He
speaks of the implications which follow from our knowledge that our natural re-
"'Id. at §27-22.
2 KAN. GEN. STAT. §72-1103 (1949).
"' CASWELL AND OTHERS, CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYmSTs 23-37 (Bureau of
Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 195o). This volume contains an extensive bibli-
ography on the topic of curriculum planning.
"' AMERICAN EDUCATION AND INTERNAoNAL. TENSIONS (NAT. EDUC. Ass'N, 1949).
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sources are not inexhaustible. He sketches the potential for good and ill that may
come from atomic developments.
Educators are not alone in their consciousness of these demands for curriculum
change. A great many lay people are equally alert. This has unquestionably been
true throughout the years. There have always been current demands occasioned by
a particular era.
To a significant extent when lay people have felt that some curriculum adjust-
ment was in order they have turned to the legislature. They have done so out of a
feeling that the effort was the quickest and best way to get results.
Considering this attitude from the standpoint of theory, the conclusion follows
that legislation might appear on the books which would be quite harmful to the
purposes of the school. Such approach might seriously ignore sound principles of
education. As an example, the serious mistake could be made of not relating' in a
meaningful way the curriculum to the lives of pupils.
That this would indeed be a mistake is a logical deduction to be drawn from
the stress which Caswell 5 puts on the necessity in curriculum planning
to study the developmental needs of children and youth, to analyse the goals and purposes
that challenge them, to be well aware of the abilities they possess, and to be assured
that what it is proposed to include in the curriculum will find a congenial setting in
learning experiences.
Further commenting the same author says,
46
It is possible to do actual harm by including otherwise meritorious areas within the
curriculum when they conflict with the foregoing consideration. Children may be
made fearful and insecure by too great emphasis on social problems for which there
are no ready solutions. Introduction of instruction on marriage and family relations
at an inappropriate age may result in self-consciousness and unhealthy curiosity. And so
with other matters.
The question we must face now is one of fact. Have lay pressure groups put
school laws on the books which seriously interfere with the attainment of sound
educational objectives? Fortunately, the answer appears to be that they have not.
The great mass of laws provide for instruction in such fundamental areas that we
cannot find fault with them. The large percentage of these laws are so general and
reasonable as respects grade placement of the fundamental subjects enumerated as
to cause no concern. The majority of the states still allow a substantial chance for
local communities to work out a curriculum to suit local needs. State school laws
have not closed the door of opportunity for the professional educator to make a major
contribution to curriculum planning. The fact, for example, that lawmakers have
not attempted to dictate method of instruction is a factor favorable for educators
working on curriculum planning. All in all, it seems apparent that today the in-
terests of most pupils do not suffer because of state action in respect to curriculum
requirements.
" CASWELL, op. ct. supra note 43, at 39. A Ibid.
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In some few instances state legislation may have cluttered up a curriculum by
making a requirement which would be vetoed by the majority of educators after
weighing in the scale of relative values. It remains true, moreover, that the state
has the potential power to seriously interfere with the interests of pupils by passing
curriculum legislation which ignores sound educational philosophy. It, therefore,
seems appropriate to devote some space in this article to a suggestion which should
help to make certain that the state will never so act.
Educators can help to make it certain. They can do so if they accept a responsi-
bility which is theirs.
The public is most likely to agitate for legislative reform of the curriculum if it
is not kept aware of what the schools are attempting to do, why they are doing it,
and what they are accomplishing. Misconceptions thrive in an atmosphere where
public educators do not take the public into their confidence. These misconceptions
can lead to pressure for legal control which may be harmful to school goals.
Educators have the responsibility of keeping the public informed. There are
innumerable ways of doing so. School sponsored meetings, talks by school officials,
publicity programs which give factual information in mass mediums of communica-
tion, newsletters, annual reports, and special type pamphlets all serve effectively in
the effort. Good teaching and the maintenance of good teacher-pupil relations can-
not be overlooked as a most effective way of indirectly informing parents and the
community of the work of the school.
A great deal of space could be used in detailing the specific techniques that can
be employed to keep the public informed of the work of the schools. Such emphasis
does not seem appropriate for this discussion.
One method does, however, require particular mention. Educators must con-
vince the public that they are continually alert to the need of making sound curricu-
lum progress. A good approach in this effort dictates the use of committees and
other devices in order to get broad lay participation in working closely with edu-
cators for the improvement of the school offerings. Especial care should be used
to enlist the cooperation of thought leaders in various areas of endeavor. These
people can make a fine contribution in thinking through problems and can do a
good job of communicating the efforts of the school to the community at large.
Lay people and educators can effectively work together mutually to define a valid
philosophy of education for contemporary life.
In his book, Curriculum Planning4 7 Edward A. Krug sets forth the following
illustration of a good statement of school purposes:
i. To help every student grow up successfully in our society, to build his mental health,
and to achieve maximum personality development and personal effectiveness.
2. To help each student get a chance to sample various types of recreational activities
and to develop skill in a few.
3. To teach the skills of democratic group planning and discussion.
4. To teach the skills of reflective thinking and group problem solving.
'
T Pp. 64-67 (1950).
110
CONTROL OF TEXTBOOK SELECTION
5. To support the established family pattern of Western civilization by realistic study
of problems and difficulties.
6. To develop an understanding of world-wide social problems and a concern with
our country's role in world peace.
7. To study continuously the meaning of democracy....
8. To develop literacy in all citizens: language, quantitative, economic, industrial.
If this type of philosophy statement was the result of mutual cooperation between
educators and intelligently selected lay people, it should be apparent that there would
be created a favorable climate for curriculum construction which would serve the
best interests of pupils. Then if it is widely made known that the objectives were
mutually determined and if alert and sound educational leadership makes the pub-
lic aware of the true facts on efforts to implement the goals, there will seldom be any
need felt by the public to foster legislative control of the curriculum. The possi-
bility of unwise legislation will thereby be reduced to a minimum.
But direct state action is not the only type of legislation which may affect the
curriculum. Local school boards have quasi-legislative power.4 s  Previously this
article pointed out that a great many states have delegated to local school boards
major discretion in curriculum formulation. Since school board members are usually
laymen in educational matters,49 there arises a problem somewhat similar to that
involved in state legislators attempting to prescribe school courses and content.
The solution to this problem is no different from the one suggested as valuable
as insurance against unwise state legislative action. It is already recognized that
boards of education should not enact regulations pertaining to courses of study and
educational philosophy without the recommendations of their professional experts,
particularly the recommendations of their chief executive officer, the superintendent.
Most boards will not be tempted to act in disregard of professional advice unless the
pressure from the public becomes too great. Generally, the public pressure will
reach such proportions as a result of the existence of the same factors which have
already been presented as exerting an influence on state curriculum legislation. The
remedy to prevent the growth of such factors is the same as has previously been
discussed. Educators must accept a major role in effecting the remedy.
INDI ECT CONTROL OF THE CURRICULUM
Today almost two-thirds of the states prescribe that teachers take an oath of
allegiance to the United States Constitution and state constitution of the state where
they are employed."'
In recent years much additional law has sought to supplement the philosophy
of affirmance of allegiance by provisions requiring teachers to swear that they do
not belong to the Communist party or its affliates and by forbidding teachers to hold
SNVAnD G. REEDER, Tux FuNDAzNTALs OF PUBLIC SCHOOL AD !NInsTRr;ON 8o-Si (3 d ed. 1951).
,Id. at 97.
0 Id. at 8i.1 1 TEACHERS OATHS AND RELATED STATE REQUIREmENTS (NAT. EDuc. Ass'N, COMMITrE ON TENURE
AND ACADEMIc FRPEDor, 1949).
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membership in subversive groups and activities that may be considered to advocate
the overthrow of the government by violence or illegal means. 2
Laws of such sort merit discussion in this article because of their indirect effect
upon the school curriculum. It is quite obvious that in requiring teachers to hold
allegiance to federal and state constitutions a restriction of a sort is placed upon
what they can teach. And at least a partial reason"3 for providing for the discharge
of teachers belong to movements that advocate the illegal overthrow of the govern-
ment is that of insuring that those who adhere to such philosophy will not be able
to spread it in the public schools.
The right of states to take steps to protect against subversive teaching in the
schools is supported by the majority decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York.P4 The majority upheld
the very restrictive55 Feinberg law and permitted the discharge of teachers who be-
longed to groups listed by the Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York as advocating the overthrow of the government by force. Their opinion,
while admitting that teachers had a right to assemble, speak, think, and believe as
they will, emphasized that "a teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom"
and, therefore, the state has a "vital concern" and a "right . . . to screen the . . .
teachers ... as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of
ordered society...."so
In recent times there has been a rash of comment, both in legal publications and
others, which has argued the fairness and wisdom of teacher oath legislation and
of that of the type of the Feinberg law. Many see in the oath requirements an in-
sult to a profession which generally speaking has stood as a staunch defender of
our way of life. Others see a serious threat to academic freedom in the type of
legislation under discussion.57 A great number quarrel with the inadequacy of the
statutory standards which are set up for determining disloyalty. ' 8
While those critical of teacher loyalty legislation often present arguments worthy
of some consideration, it seems to this writer that as respects the fundamental prin-
ciple involved the state does have a right to ask teachers to take an oath that they
will uphold the Constitution and that they do not belong to the Communist party
or other groups which advocate the overthrow of the government by force. It also
" For an indication of the states which have enacted such legislation and a good summary of the
common characteristics and major divergencies, see Prendergast, State L-egislatures and Communism:
The Current Scene, 44 Am. POL. SCe. REv. 556 (xg5o).
" It is recognized that another important reason for the legislation is the belief that a teacher's
influence pervades more than the classroom. The law takes cognizance of the fact that a teacher's
attitude may have a profound effect outside the classroom.
5 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
The Feinberg Law (N. Y. EDUCATION LAW §3022 (953)) is called the most restrictive of its
kind by MADALINE KINTER REMMLEIN, THE LAW OF LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMuINSAriON 177 (1953).
=a 342 U. S. at 493.
"'ALAN BATi, THE LOYALTY oF FREE MEN C. IX (1951), presents most of the usual arguments.
" Because an analysis of standards falls outside the topic of this article, the writer does not under-
take to discuss objections based on inadequacy. The assumption herein is that standards are used which
will pass the test of constitutionality.
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does not appear unreasonable for the state to refuse to employ or continue in its
employment those teachers who belong to groups which urge the overthrow of the
government by illegal methods.
The extent to which such legislation controls the curriculum seems entirely
proper. It is very difficult to ignore the fact stressed by the United States Supreme
Court in the Adler case.59 The teacher is indeed in a strategic position. It is proper
that government protect itself against teachers using their favored position to en-
courage its overthrow by improper methods. And, since the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, it is legitimate for government to require teachers to in-
struct in harmony with its philosophy.
It is generally recognized that the term liberty never means unbridled freedom.
It seems clear that an instructor cannot teach whatever he pleases. Furthermore,
since the teacher can influence in such subtle ways, his liberty to espouse the Com-
munist philosophy outside the classroom does not give him the right to continued
employment in the public schools. The opportunity to teach in the public school
is a privilege which cannot be abused by adherence to a philosophy which advocates
the forceful overthrow of the very government which grants the opportunity to teach.
James Marshall in "The Defense of Public Education From Subversion'"6" makes
a very forceful comment on the true meaning of academic freedom. He says:
Education has a central position in our structure of civil rights and freedom. Civil
rights and freedom as we understand them are basic means by which in our American
culture we handle our hostilities, free our reason from subservience and undue anxiety,
and increase our productivity. It is important to us, therefore, that education be un-
censored and that teachers be not subjected to autocratic controls. Consequently one of
our freedoms is academic freedom; but this assumes that the teacher himself is free to
use his reason to the best of his ability and is neither committed to the perversion of
truth, to the justification of autocracy, to the teaching of hatred, nor to the forceful
overthrow of the government. It likewise assumes that students have the right to learn
the truth, to have all the facts before them including the intellectual commitments of
their teachers.
When these assumptions are not met, a teacher can have no justification in pleading
the right to teach in the name of an academic freedom which he himself has cor-
rupted.
Another type of indirect restriction on the curriculum is found by Brudney6" to
exist in state teacher tenure regulations. Specifically alluding to statutes which
provide that teachers on tenure may be dismissed for "good cause," for "cause mani-
festly sufficient" or for certain enumerated specific reasons and "other just cause,"
the writer sees a "virtually unbridled discretion which . . . may operate as a re-
striction on the teacher's actions in the classroom. . . ." He further comments that
"the nebulous formulae permit the application of divers pressures upon the instruc-
so 342 U. S. 485 (1952)-
00 51 COL. L. REV. 587, 603-604 (x951).
" Brudney, Legislative Regulation of the Social Studies in Secondary Schools, 9 YEARBOOK or ScHOOL
LAw 140, 165 (1941).
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tional staff by superiors in the educational system and indirectly by interested groups
out of it."
In actual practice, however, this writer does not feel that tenure laws exercise a
significant enough different type of control over the curriculum to justify detailed
review of the cases construing the rights of school authorities to dismiss tenure
teachers under the "other good and sufficient cause" type of wording.
It is self-evident that if a teacher were to refuse to follow the course of study
prescribed by state law or duly constituted school authorities, the refusal could be
looked upon as grounds for dismissal under "for cause" legislation.6 2 It is equally
apparent that a teacher who preached subversive doctrine in the classroom could be
dismissed for cause. As the Massachusetts court has said, "'good cause, is held to
include any ground which is put forward by the Committee in good faith and which
is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the [school] committee's
task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system.' ,0 Certainly an
efficient school system cannot tolerate the preaching of subversion.
These results from the application of tenure laws do not appear startling or un-
sound.
There is, however, an existing philosophy used to justify discharge under "for
cause" statutes which gives some support to Brudney's position. Decisions have
held that if a teacher has earned undesirable notoriety in the community his use-
fulness in the classroom may be at an end--even if the facts which gave rise to the
reputation are not actually true.
4
Holdings of this type raise some interesting questions. Would they influence a
teacher in a particular locality to modify the expression of his economic or social
viewpoint6 5 so as to conform with the general climate of thought? Would teachers
not dare to do otherwise because of a fear that an expression of certain viewpoints
might bring the kind of notoriety that would mushroom into loss of control over
students in the classroom and resultant loss of tenure? If this is true, there exists
a form of control over the curriculum.
It is not possible to give a statistical answer to the question. Certainly, some
instructors may be consciously or unconsciously influenced, in the manner indicated,
by the existence of "for cause" tenure provisions.6" It is more likely that a greater
number, regardless of tenure regulation, are aware of the practical fact that they
cannot be happy in a community if they express too vehemently economic or social
views that are too far out of harmony with the general philosophy of the com-
munity. On the assumption this is true, there seems to be little reason to center
" ]ack of cooperation as grounds for discharge "for cause" is upheld in Stiver v. State ex tel. Kent,
211 Ind. 380, 1 N. E. 2d xoo6 (936).
"
5 Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 362, 3o N. E. 2d 40!, 4o6 (1940),
quoting from Rinaldo v. Dreyer, 294 Mass. 167, 169, i N. E. 2d 37, 38 (1936).
"'Anthony v. Phoenix Union High School District v. Maricopa County, 55 Ariz. 265, 100 P. 2d
988 (1940); Baird v. School District No. 25, Fremont County, 41 Wyo. 451, 287 Pac. 308 (1930).
" The phrase economic or social viewpoint as used above does not mean a seditious viewpoint.
"Especially if they knew of such action.
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too much concern on the effect of tenure legislation on the curriculum through
causing modification of the expression of an economic or social outlook.
TEXTBOOK SELECTION AS AFFECTING THE CURRICULUM
It is quite apparent that the quality and type of textbooks used in a school system
can make the difference between an effective and an inadequate curriculum.
Professor Gwynn points out that the "textbook reflects and establishes standards
... [and] by its teaching and learning aids it markedly affects methods... ." "Re-
gardless," he says, "of whether some school systems or some teachers supplement the
textbook with library materials . . . the textbook is still the main tool employed by
teachers.""7
This role which the textbook plays suggests that no article which deals with state
laws affecting the curriculum can ignore a treatment of the laws from the stand-
point of their impact upon textbook selection.
As was true in connection with the part of this article which dealt with direct
state regulation of the curriculum, the approacl to provisions relating to textbook
selection will not be a statistical one.68 Rather the technique used spotlights types
of provisions and refers for illustrations to certain state statutes. This is done for
the purpose of laying the groundwork for an evaluation of the various methods by
which states exercise their rights to supervise the choice and adoption of textbooks
for use in the public schools.
Certain common features of statutory regulations concerning textbook selection
are clearly discernible. As regards their fundamental approach, states can be
grouped into three categories-those in which the State Board of Education is the
adopting agency,69 those which provide for local choice,70 and those which have set
up Commissions or Committees to recommend the books to be adopted.7 '
"J. MINor Gwsxs, CuRiucuLum PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL TRENDS 221-223 (rev. ed. x95o). The
writer's position is expressed in a quote from E. B. WESLEY, TEArHiNG THE SOCIAL StmsS 375 (2d ed.
1942).
'The Loughery dissertation (BERNARD F. LOUGHERY, PARENTAL RIGHTS IN AMERIcAN EDUCATIONAL
LAW, op. cit. supra note 3) does present a statistical report. Also see EDUCArIO-n: TXTBOOK SECTION, A
REPORT TO THE COMs/TTE ON FUNCTIONS AND REsOURCES Os STATE GOVERNMENT, PREPARED BY THE
STAFF OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMMIssioN, RES. PuB No. 17 (KENTUCKY, 1952). It is interesting
to compare the modern compilations with TISHWELL, STATE CONTROL OF TExrBooXs, CoLumIBIA UNr-
VEatS' CONTRIUTIONS TO EDUCATION No. 299 (x928). It can be seen that there has not been too
much shift in the basic attitudes of the various states.
"SFor example: California (CAL. CODE FDUC. §11151) (the California law pertains only to the
selections of textbooks for elementary schools; the governing board of each high school district is given
the power in that area); Kansas (KANS. GEN. STAT. §72-4101); Delaware (DEm. CODE ANN. §4104).
"As illustrative: Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. c. 122, §28-6); Iowa (IowA CODE §301.1; either local
district or county as determined by voters, §301.23); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. v. 37, §5o(2)); Michigan
(MICH. CoMp. LAws §381.2); Missouri (Mo. Rv. STAT. §170.100; in the case of cities, §170.70
(1949)); Nebraska (REv. STAT. NEB. c. 79, §4,118 (re-issue of 195o)); New Hampshire (REv. LAws
N. H. c. 135, §16 (1942)); New York (N. Y. EDUCATION LAw §701); Ohio (Omo CoDE ANN. §4854-7;
local school boards select from lists adopted by County Board of Education).
"'For example: California (CAL. CODE EDuc. §§xsx56 and 11157); Utah (UTAH CoDE ANN. §53-13-
I); Oregon (ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. §ixi-2O0x); Oklahoma (Or.A. STAT. c. 70, §x6-12 (1951));
Florida (FLA. STAT. §233.09 (X953)); North Carolina (N. C. GEN. STAT. §§115-275, 115-278-5, 115-
278-6 (1952)); Indiana (IND. STAT. ANN. §29-4 05).
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In the case of the latter group, the recommendations are usually mandatory ex-
cept that frequently a State Board of Education is allowed to select from a com-
mittee-approved multiple list. California 72 furnishes an example of a Commission
whose recommendations are not mandatory. The Board of Education in the state
is, however, required to give the Commission a public hearing before adopting any
book. In actual practice the suggestions of the Commission are usually accepted.
There is about an even split among the 48 states (including those that make use
of Commission suggestions) between those that provide for some form of state
adoption and those that permit local school authorities to select textbooks.
Iowa73 and Wisconsin7 4 make it possible, under certain conditions, for the people
of the school district to vote upon county adoption in place of local adoption.
Since the use of a textbook committee or commission constitutes an effort to insure
securing the opinion of those with professional qualifications, a look at the personnel
requirements set forth in the statutes authorizing such groups should be of interest.
California provides for a Commission made up of the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction and io additional members appointed by the Superintendent of
Public Instruction with the approval of the State Board of Education.78 Among the
appointive members there must be at least one county superintendent of schools, one
city superintendent, one person employed in a junior college who holds a teacher's
certificate, one high and one elementary school principal, one college teacher of
education, and one classroom teacher.7" In Kansas77 the Advisory Committee is
named by the State Board of Education. There is a separate committee for the
elementary, junior high and senior high schools. The total membership of each
committee is to be from 5 to 7. The majority shall be supervisors, principals, super-
intendents or teachers. They are to be selected so as to represent all types of schools
in which the books adopted are to be used. Two members are to be persons not
engaged in the teaching profession.
The state superintendent of public instruction, dean of the State School of Educa-
tion, and 5 school superintendents are appointed to the Textbook Commission in
Utah.78  Oregon's79 Textbook Commission is appointed by the State Board of Edu-
cation. It is to consist of 5 citizens of recognized scholarship and professional stand-
ing who shall have been actively and continuously engaged in teaching or super-
vision of schools in the state for five years preceding the date of appointment. A
provision is made for an alternative selection from the faculties of normal schools or
institutions of higher learning. The statute sets out a plan of nominating for ap-
pointment individuals who come from various areas of the state.
The Oklahoma 0 Textbook Committee is made up of 8 members appointed by
the Governor. Each member must have five years' experience teaching or super-
vising in the public schools of the state and at least four years' college training. A
"'CA.. CODE EDuc. §§iir56 and 11157 (1952).
"
1 IOWA CODE §§273.12 and 273.13. "Ws. STAT. S§40.48 and 40,49.
"
5 CAL. CODE EDUC. §1o,oo. "1 d. at §10,002.
"KAN. GEN. STAT. §72.4129. 18 UTAH CODE ANN. §53-I3-.
"
9 ORE. Comp. LAws §ix-2oo (1940). "0 OK.A. STAT. c. 70, §x6-i (9511).
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minimum of 3 of the group must be classroom teachers. The State Superintendent
of Public Instruction serves as a secretary and votes only when there is a tie. There
is a provision that not more than one from any particular area should be named
to the Committee. A unique feature of the Oklahoma law is its setting up of local
textbook committees who are to select books from the multiple list determined upon
by the State Textbook Committee.8'
Florida82 has a textbook rating committees" of 12 members actively engaged in
teaching or supervision in the public elementary, high or teacher training institutions
in the state and representing the major fields and levels in which textbooks are
used. The State Superintendent and a member of his department whom he desig-
nates are ex officio members.
In North Carolina8 4 the Governor and the State Superintendent may appoint
a textbook commission of 12 members. Seven are to be outstanding teachers and
principals in the elementary grades, 7 with the same qualifications are to come
from high schools. One may be a county or a city superintendent. The members
from the elementary field evaluate all books offered for such grade level. The high
school members review the books designed for the secondary grades85
Even among those states that do not provide for local participation in textbook
selection there is frequent delegation to local districts of the right to select books
from a multiple list furnished by a state body. 8 In some jurisdictions this grant is
only to high schools.
Often clauses in state laws spell out permission to secure supplementary texts8
It is quite usual for jurisdictions with state adoption regulations to exempt cities
of a certain size and permit them to make independent selections88
Kansas89 makes it possible for the State Board of Education to test books in 40
or 50 of the average schools of the state for not less than one year or more than two
so that a comparison of progress can be made with those previously in use.
In about one-fourth of the states there is a prohibition against the use of texts that
are in any way sectarian, denominational, partisan or seditious in content.
In the large number of states that entrust textbook choice to local school boards,
the actual practice is generally for the board to delegate its authority to the super-
intendent of schools or to a local committee made up of teachers and supervisors.
Even if the delegation is to the superintendent, it is usual for him to set up a com-
"I1d. at §z6-io.
81
FLA. STAT. §233.07 (1953).3 The Committee rates each book and furnishes a written report to the State Board of Education
indicating in relative order the three most suitable books.
8"N. C. GEN. STAT. §,15-278-5.
"bEach member files a written evaluation of each book and then meets with the State Board of
Education (N. C. GEN. STAT. §115-278-6). A joint examination of the reports is made before the
Board selects, from the evaluated list.
:a IND. STAT. ANN. §28-666; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §5122.
8CAL. CODE EDuc. 5ii5r.
8Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. c. 122, §34-8); Oregon (ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. 55hss-14o2 and
111-2011); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §53-13-").
; GEN. STAT. KAN. §72-4105.
LAV AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
mittee of professional educators to help with the task of evaluation and advice. The
recommendations of the committees are usually accepted.
The same pattern generally results in those cities that are exempted from state
adoption regulations.
The constitutions of Colorado9° and Wyoming 9l state that neither the legislature
nor the state board of education nor state superintendent of public instruction shall
have the power to prescribe textbooks to be used in the public schools.
Many states protect the textbook selecting authority in its relations with pub-
lishers. This is true even in the case of a considerable number of the states that
permit local school authorities to make the decisions as to choice of books. Common
provisions of this type require publishers to deposit books with the state authority,
to deposit a stipulated amount to accompany bids to insure execution of the con-
tract if the bid is accepted, to file surety bonds conditional upon the full and faith-
ful performance of the contract, to agree that no higher prices may be charged in
the particular state than are charged elsewhere in the United States, taking into con-
sideration cost of shipping and dealers' commission, and to provide for prices at
which adopted books may be exchanged for more recently adopted ones.
Another extremely common feature running through state endeavors to regulate
textbook selection is the requirement pertaining to the frequency with which text-
books can be changed. States have realized a need to protect school patrons (and
taxpayers in the case of free textbooks) against the expense of too frequent change.
Many have understood the need to prevent too long use of a book without re-
evaluation and have set a limit on original adoption. The most commonly named
time span is four or five years. Three and six years appear in a number of statutes.
Ten is the maximum mentioned.
Some states have used qualifying phraseology to permit textbook change sooner
than the general provision found in the law. For instance, in Illinois 2 cities of over
5oo,ooo, textbooks are not to be changed oftener than four years except upon the
recommendation of the general superintendent of schools approved by the ii man
Board; in Kansas9" textbooks cannot be changed unless they are in use for five years
except that the Board of Education shall have authority to vary the period of adop-
tion for high school classics so as to meet college entrance requirements; and in
Utah94 any textbook found unsatisfactory can be changed or any textbook of unusual
merit may be added to the adopted list at any regular meeting of the textbook
commission.
In addition to the time restrictions, much state legislation also regulates textbook
change at each adoption period through the techniques of allowing as new adoptions
only a certain percentage of all the books or a certain number of books at each
grade or subject level.
Most state laws put textbook selection on an annual basis. A biennial plan is set
90 COLO. CONST. Art. i6, §9. "1 WYo. CONSr. Art. 7, §2.
9 IL. REv. STAT. c. §122, 34-8. "'GEN. STAT. KAN. §72-410.
"UTAH. CODE ANN. §53-13-3.
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forth in some of the laws. A few states make no specific requirement as to spacing
between the preparation of textbook lists.
EFFECTIVENESS AND WISDOM OF STATE LEGISLATIVE
CONTROL OVER SELECTION OF THE TEXTBOOKS
All that has been written pertaining to the pattern of state policies toward text-
book selection should demonstrate, just as did the discussion of state control over
courses of study, that it is only state and federal constitutions which limit state
legislative power over the public schools.
Since the range of state power is so unlimited and the textbook plays such an
important role in the education of the young, it becomes logical, just as it did
previously at the conclusion of the outline of state course-of-study legislation, to
raise some questions concerning the effectiveness and wisdom of existing statutory
attitudes toward the selection of textbooks.
The matter of state uniformity versus local adoption has been long and much
debated. 5 The most common arguments in favor of state uniformity can be summed
up as follows:
i. Books will cost less because of quantity purchases and saving to the publisher in sales
expenses.
2. State commissions are better qualified to select than many local boards and commis-
sions.
3. Families do not lose on books when they move from one school district to another.
4. The use of uniform textbooks throughout the state makes possible the adoption of a
minimum state course of study which can be enforced.
The proponents of local adoption answer by:
i. Pointing to facts which indicate that costs under a local adoption plan need not be
greater than those under state adoption.
2. Raising the query as to whether a uniform course of study best meets the individual
needs of children in each local community.
3. Rather logically showing that the matter of family cost to those who remove from
the district is not a major issue.
4. Pointing out that a state commission with its limited membership cannot best serve
the needs of pupils in all areas.
Reflection upon both viewpoints enables the writer to present an evaluation of the
present state plans for textbook adoption.
If there are educational disadvantages to state-wide adoption of uniform texts, the
slight possible cost saving does not seem to justify the plan.
Certainly the use of a commission or textbook committee in connection with
state-wide adoption plans is desirable. There is considerable merit in the contention
that such groups are better qualified to survey all possibilities and select books
Or See, for a discussion on the point, STAT CONTROL OF TExTBooKs, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY CON-
TRIBUTiONS TO EDucerxON No. 299, C. IV (1928).
120 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
than are some local regions. But there is also much to be said for the viewpoint
that state-wide commissions cannot best sense local needs.
It is undoubtedly the recognition of such facts that has caused many jurisdictions
to compromise by permitting cities and districts of a certain size to make their
own selection and by requiring that state textbook commissions submit a multiple
list so that the smaller areas will have some opportunity to make a decision with
thought to their particular needs. It would seem that all the regions with state-wide
adoption legislation should so compromise.
The attitude of those states that entrust selection to local school boards is be-
coming more realistic each year. Even if legislation does not require it, there is
great use at the local level of advisory textbook committees made up of superin-
tendents, administrators, and teachers. Each year more school administrators and
teachers in local areas are becoming better trained professionally. Furthermore, there
is available much guidance for those who work on textbook committees. University
schools of education usually have experts whose counsel can be sought. Books
and articles have been written on the subjectf0
From the standpoint of good relations with the community the local adoption
plan of selection is the best plan. If the determination of the texts is done on a local
basis, it is easier to keep the public informed as to the merit of the book in serving
local course of study needs.
The importance of such effort was presented in a previous section of this article.
Since the textbook is such a basic tool in educational endeavor, there is just as much
reason to use the formerly suggested techniques for enlightening the public as there
is for doing so in connection with courses of study and educational philosophy.
Other provisions on textbook legislation lend themselves to brief evaluation.
From the standpoint of serving individual school needs a multiple list is to be ap-
proved over a basal one. For the same reason, there needs to be provisions for
adoption of supplementary texts.
Statements controlling frequency of change are reasonable, particularly if the
limit is set at not more than four or five years. The law should permit changes to
be made more frequently in exceptional circumstances such as may arise in fields
where there is a rapid development in subject matter content. Less reasonable but
perhaps oftentimes financially expedient are the statements which curtail to a cer-
tain percentage the change that can be made at any one adoption period.
Generally, those regulations which protect the textbook selecting authority in its
relations with publishers are worthwhile.
One remaining aspect of the textbook selection problem requires discussion. It
is the matter as to whether there is any danger to "freedom to learn" through what
one writer describes as "the local school board playing censor with controversial
ideas in books and magazines" '
"' For example: JoHN A. CLEMENT, MANUAL PoR ANALYZING AND SELECTING TExTBOOKs (1942).
97 Comment, School Boards, Schoolbooks, and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L. J. 928 (1950).
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The anonymous commentator in the Yale Law Journal sees in the actions of
school boards a real danger which he sums up as follows:9
Suppression of opinion in a public school is the antithesis of education . . . . Admin-
istratively its inherent evil is an incapacity to draw the line. Once a book banning
precedent is established, future exclusions are made simpler. A board which removes
books critical of Catholics today must reasonably respond to the injured cries of Jews
and Negroes, perhaps even Democrats and Republicans tomorrow.
A recent study conducted by the American Council on Education indicates that current
teaching materials are "guilty of failing to come to grips with basic issues in the complex
problems of human relations." [Footnote omitted.] Perhaps school boards might better
devote their energies towards establishment of school programs wherein basic contro-
versial issues would be openly studied and discussed....
But for those who have less faith in the Freedom to Learn, an exemplary legal
sanction is urgent....
Much the same concern was expressed at the recent Chicago University Law
School Conference on The Arts, Publishing and the Law by the then General
Counsel of the American Book Publishers Council.P9
The issues raised by such thinking cannot be dealt with in any general statement.
Indeed, in many respects it is hard to deal with them at all unless the factual pattern
is spelled out in detail.
If a book is intentionally "critical" of any religious or racial group, it would
appear entirely improper that it be used in the public school. Surely, if sectarianism
cannot be taught in the public schools, as the courts admit, 10 0 an attack on a par-
ticular religious or racial group cannot be sanctioned. If such intentional criticism
is presented it would seem to fall within the condemnation of Rosenberg v. Board
of Education of City of New York.' 0° It would be outlawed because written
"for the apparent purpose of promoting and fomenting a bigoted and intolerant
hatred against a particular racial or religious group....
If an endeavor was made to indicate impartially points of friction between groups
without any effort to take sides there is probably no legal reason to condemn the
approach. In the area of controversy, a book used in the public school might be
fully approved if it did not attempt to influence people and merely contented itself
with a clear, impartial statement of the conflicting points of view. The great diffi-
culty, however, is often the determination of whether an approach to a controversial
issue is impartial. Viewed by some, it may seem to be so. Scrutinized by others,
it may appear not to be so. This differing attitude as to the impartiality of approach
will exist not only in respect to the presentation of points of friction between re-
00 1d. at 954.
"
9Farmer, The Pressure Group Censors the Author, CONFPaENeE SERIES No. o 132 (1952).
""0Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U. S. 306 (1952).
101 x96 Misc. 542, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
102 x96 Misc. at 543, 92 N. Y. S. 2d at 346.
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ligious, racial and political groups but also in connection with the presentation of
varying social or economic outlooks.
A textbook dealing with controversial issues may affect selecting authorities in
just such fashion. It may appear impartial to one. To another it will not. The
fact that there may be this divergence of opinion is no reason to say that there should
be admitted into the public school any and all books dealing with controversial
issues. There is certainly no legal justification for the dissemination in the public
school of propaganda. Minds can differ, too, on the matter as to whether, at various
age levels, children are mature enough to analyze certain controversial issues, even
if those issues are treated impartially.
In spite of the possibility of differing attitudes, decisions must be made. The
best that can be done is to set up a professionally qualified textbook selection com-
mittee of fair-minded people. Then it can generally be expected that improper
pressure will be resisted and no unreasonable "book burning" will occur. If such a
committee does exist, there should be no serious interference with "freedom to learn."
It is not fair to condemn any and all censorship as repressive and tyrannical.
Certainly, all books cannot be approved for use in the public schools. None but
the most unreasoning would, for instance, admit in the schools extreme expressions
of obscenity or a violently seditious utterance. None but the most "liberal" feel that
the public school should be a medium for a propaganda approach. Someone has
to stand guard against the propaganda approach. The professionally qualified, fair-
minded textbook committee is the best guard it seems practical to have. Censorship
of such type has a place in the democratic governmental process.10 3
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN CURRICULUM DFTERmiNATION
The topic of state control over the curriculum cannot be concluded without some
reference to parental rights in curriculum determination. It is in order to make
some analysis of the respective powers of the parent and the state to decide what
specific subjects or course of study should be offered to a particular child.
Justice McReynolds' pronouncement in Pierce v. Society of Sisters °4 that "the
child is not the mere creature of the state" and that "those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations" is perhaps most frequently cited to support
parental rights.
Although the language seems quite specific, it must be remembered that the
Society of Sisters case involved a state effort to wipe out private schools and require
attendance at public schools. The high priority of a parent's constitutional right
to make a choice between a private and public school seems very clear. It is not
nearly so apparent that the parent has a right to select for his child just exactly the
"°The last sentence is the philosophy of Judge Charles S. Desmond of the New York Court of
Appeals. See his article, Censoring the Movies, 29 Norm DAme LAW. 27 (1953).
:to 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925).
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subjects he should pursue in the public school. Indeed some reflection seems to
indicate that there must be some limit to the right.
If we believe that the professional schoolman generally knows more about the
educational needs of children than the average layman parent, we must concede
that it could be wholly unrealistic to allow the parent to revamp the curriculum to
suit his whims. Schools might find it very difficult to maintain discipline and set
standards for graduation if they were bound to respond to every parental plea.
Furthermore, in many regions it would be impractical to give the parent full free-
dom of choice. Many schools simply could not offer the myriad subjects which
might be necessary to satisfy parental requests.
The realization of such facts undoubtedly influenced the courts to generally agree
upon two fundamental principles: (i) that a parent may control his child's educa-
tion only in so far as such control impairs neither the efficacy of the school system
nor the interests of the other pupils,. 5 and (2) that certain studies plainly essential
to good citizenship must be taught.1°6
The difficulty is that the enunciated principles do not constitute a definite yard-
stick. Judicial minds can and do differ in connection with the use of the formula.
For instance, in working with the "good citizenship" rule most courts would ac-
knowledge that the good citizen must be literate and understand our form of gov-
ernment. Therefore, they would refuse to allow a parent to prevent his child from
studying the fundamentals of mathematical computation, of English composition,
and of United States history and government. But when, for example, the question
is raised as to whether a course in music, 0 7 dancing,"' art, or domestic science0 9 is
essential to the training for good citizenship, judicial minds may differ.
Many subjects stand in between the extremes of the indicated examples. In such
an intermediate area, there is always the possibility of varying attitudes on the part
of the courts.
This article has already shown that certain state statutes list subject matter fields
that must be taught. Many of the fields mentioned are those which the courts would
agree are fundamental in training for good citizenship. All courts may not, how-
ever, necessarily agree that every child should be made to take each specific course
which may be designed to give training in the various fields.
In the effort to determine if the parents' request will impair the efficacy of the
school system or the interest of other pupils, the courts often have to struggle with
many practical considerations which may influence the outcome. It will not be
... Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874); Trustees of Schools v. the People ex rel. Martin Van Allen,
87 IIL 303 (1877).
" "People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Co1. 397, 255 Pac. 6io (1927).
"'1 School Board District No. x8, Garvin County v. Thompson, 240 Okla. r, 103 Pac. 578 (19o9),
upheld the refusal of the parent to permit his child to take a singing class. State v. Webber, xo8 Ind.
3z, 8 N. E. 708 (i886), held contra on substantially the same facts.108 Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees of Fruitridge School District, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac.
49 (1921), upheld the parent's objection to his child taking dancing.
109 State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039 (1914), sided with a parental
protest against having a child take domestic science.
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possible to permit the same degree of choice in a small school as in a large one. And
if the parents' demands cannot be met, requirements of discipline may dictate against
allowing the child to reduce his total course load.
One court, however, has suggested that there may be a way for the parent to
get around the obstacle of limited course offerings at a school. In Sherer v. School
District of North Beaver Township,"10 the Pennsylvania court held that a parent
who lived in a district which operated only a vocational school could send his child
to a nearby district for instruction in an academic high school and that the vocational
school district was bound to pay for the child's tuition. The order was made even
though it was shown that the child could study academic subjects in the vocational
school. The court seemed to think that the vocational school would not afford an
atmosphere as conducive to the study of academic subjects as a school which puts
major emphasis on such program. In arriving at its conclusion, the court was aided
by a state statute which sanctioned the choice which the parent made. It would not
be as certain that a court would have approved the parent's request in the absence
of an assisting statute. And if there was no statute a neighboring district might
refuse to accept the pupil.
In many instances there may be no solution through the technique under dis-
cussion because of the distance involved between schools.
There is one type of parental demand which requires special analysis. An ob-
jection to a particular course is often made on the ground that the content conflicts
with the parents' religious belief. Such objections are pointed at science and hygiene
instruction. Frequently a parent may claim that a Bible class constitutes sectarian
education.
In actuality, the largest percentage of parental objections to specific courses do
raise the religious conflict issue. Most school boards and courts (and, indeed, a
number of statutes) are very liberal in their recognition of the validity of the ob-
jection. A study of the cases will not be presented in this article. The philosophy
which controls will be covered in another discussion in this symposium.
CONCLUSION
Because of the variation in legislative provisions pertaining to state control over
curriculum and textbook selection, it is somewhat difficult to summarize. It does
seem, however, that for the most part the supervisory control of the state has not been
unreasonably arbitrary. There is, of course, opportunity for improvement in the
attitude of some jurisdictions.
110 141 Pa. Sup. 401, X4 A. 2d 855 (1940).
